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In the Wake of Tuna H: New Possibilities for
GATT-Compliant Environmental Standards
Paul J. Yechout
From its inception, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)1 has focused on economic matters, often to the ex-
clusion of environmental concerns. 2 Conversely, the U.S. Con-
gress has passed a great deal of environmental legislation in
recent years, largely in response to increased societal aware-
ness. 3 The GATT's torpidity in following this trend has resulted
in frequent conflicts between U.S. environmental laws and the
GATT4 and intense debates over the compatibility of environ-
mental safeguards and free trade.5 A 1991 GATT dispute panel
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. See Matthew Hunter Hurlock, The GATT, U.S. Law and the Environ-
ment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna /Dolphin Decision,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2098 (1992). The Agreement's preamble states that
international trade "should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the
world, and expanding the production and exchange of goods." GATT, supra
note 1, at pmbl. (emphasis added). The GATT's focus on "developing resources"
and "products," and the absence of the word "environment" from the Agree-
ment's text indicate that the drafters overlooked the environmental effects of
international trade. Hurlock, supra at 2100.
3. Recent U.S. environmental protection statutes include: the Fisher-
men's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-80 (1994) (addressing conser-
vation of Atlantic Salmon); the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1994) (authorizing the Presi-
dent to impose trade sanctions in response to other countries' treatment of
whales); and the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994) (relating
to conservation of threatened and endangered species). See also infra part I.
4. See generally Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish
Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and
Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 477 (1991) (examining the conflict
between enforcement mechanisms for various U.S. environmental protection
statutes and U.S. obligations under the GATT).
5. See generally Hurlock, supra note 2 (discussing the need to amend the
GATT in order to accommodate environmental interests); HILARY F. FRENCH,
COSTLY TRADEOFFS: RECONCILING TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Worldwatch
Institute Worldwatch Paper No. 113, 1993) (evaluating strategies to reconcile
conflicts of interest between free-trade and environmental groups); John H.
Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Con-
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ruling6 which invalidated the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA)7 confirmed fears that the conflict between trade and
the environment was indeed a reality. When a subsequent
GATT panel again found the MMPA in violation of the GATT in
1994, environmentalists saw further support for these fears.8
The environmentalists, however, overlooked subtle differences
in the panels' reasoning which may provide a framework under
which the U.S. Congress may formulate GATT-compatible envi-
ronmental laws.
This Note examines the distinctions between the first and
second Tuna - Dolphin decisions and the opportunity for envi-
ronmental legislation that complies with the GATT. Part I dis-
cusses the background and rationale behind the MMPA. Part II
summarizes the findings of the first tuna - dolphin panel and
U.S. responses to their reasoning. Part Id analyzes the second
tuna - dolphin decision as compared to the first. Part IV consid-
ers U.S. responses to the second panel decision, the potential im-
pact of the changes made by the second panel, and the possible
channels which these changes open for future U.S. environmen-
tal laws. This Note concludes that the framework which arose
from the second panel decision will permit a modified MMPA to
pass GATT scrutiny without sacrificing its conservationist
intent.
flict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227 (1992) (discussing areas of conflict between
GATT and environmental policies); Eliza Patterson, International Trade and
the Environment: Institutional Solutions, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,599 (1991) (ex-
plaining the need to incorporate environmental concerns into the international
trade framework).
According to David C. Phillips, executive director of the Earth Island Insti-
tute, "free trade and efforts to protect the global environment are on a collision
course." James Brooke, America - Environmental Dictator?, N.Y. TiMEs, May
3, 1992, at § 3, at 7. The effect of environmental safeguards is to subsidize for-
eign producers because they need not incur costs to comply with the environ-
mental regulations of the other nation. Robert F. Housman & Durwood J.
Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin
Decision, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,268, 10,275 (1992). The foreign producer can
pass on the resulting savings in production costs to consumers in the form of
lower prices. Id. When American environmental laws threaten the competi-
tiveness of American products on the open market, public sentiment in favor of
environmental protection is likely to diminish. Id.
6. See infra part II, discussing the first Tuna - Dolphin Decision.
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988), as amended by U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1407
(West 1994).
8. See infra part III, discussing the second Tuna - Dolphin Decision.
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I. IMPETUS FOR THE MMPA
For unknown reasons, schools of yellowfin tuna swim be-
neath pods of dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
(ETP).9 Commercial fishermen have long exploited this phe-
nomenon by using the dolphins as a means of locating the
schools of tuna which accompany them.' 0 Through a process
known as "setting on dolphin,""' fishing boats chase dolphin
pods and encircle them with purse seine nets to catch the tuna
below the dolphins. 12 To expedite the process, some tuna boats
use explosives and smaller boats to incite panic in the dolphins
and drive the frenzied pod into the center of their nets.13 As an
incidental effect of this procedure, many dolphins become entan-
gled in the nets and either drown when they cannot reach the
surface to breathe or are maimed while extricating themselves
from the nets.1 4 Dolphins not immediately killed often die later
as a direct result of their injuries or, weakened by their struggle,
as defenseless victims of sharks or other predators.' 5
The use of the purse seine technique has caused the deaths
of over six million dolphins over the past 30 years. ' 6 Public con-
9. Raul Pedrozo, The International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992: Un-
reasonable Extension of U.S. Jurisdiction in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
Fishery, 7 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 79 n.4 (1993). One theory suggests that the
association results from the similar diet of yellowfin tuna and certain species of
dolphins. Id. The Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean is the area of the Pacific
Ocean bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40 degrees south latitude, 160
degrees west longitude, and the coasts of North, Central and South America
from Chile to Southern California, with an area of approximately five to seven
million square miles. Dan Mayer & David Hoch, International Environmental
Protection and the GATT: the Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 187,
189 n.17 (1993).
10. Dolphins are readily visible to fishermen because, as mammals, the
dolphins must swim in the upper levels of the ocean and break the surface to
breathe.
11. Setting on dolphin is practiced only by yellowfin fishermen, and almost
exclusively in the ETP. Mayer & Hoch, supra note 9, at 199 n.79.
12. Hon. R. Kenton Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT - Tuna
Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957, 958 n.1 (1993). A
purse seine net is a net weighted on one end and buoyed on the other. Id. After
a school of fish is encircled by the net, the bottom of the net is closed by drawing
a line through rings attached to the weighted end in a manner similar to the
form of closure found on some purses. Id.
13. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F.Supp. 964, 967 (N.D.Cal.
1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
14. Pedrozo, supra note 9, at 79 n.7.
15. Id.
16. See Earth Island Institute, 746 F.Supp. at 928 n.2. The perfection of
the technique has drawn greater numbers of fishermen to the ETP. By the
early 1970s, the U.S. purse seine fleet consisted of over 100 vessels, with an
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cern over this high rate of "incidental takings" encouraged Con-
gress to enact the MMPA.
The MMPA addresses the detrimental effects of commercial
fishing on marine mammals and applies specifically to the pro-
tection of dolphins in relation to yellowfin tuna fishing.17
Although the Act imposes a moratorium on the taking and im-
portation of marine mammals and marine mammal products,' 8
it contains a special exception for commercial tuna fishing.' 9
This exception allows for a level of incidental dolphin mortality
provided that the fishermen implement the best available safety
techniques.20 Parties must obtain a permit from the Secretary
to qualify for the exception.2 ' Permits are not freely granted
under this provision; the only domestic entity that has received
one is the American Tunaboat Association. 22 The permit allows
the taking of 20,500 dolphins annually.23
The MMPA's provisions apply to all takings within waters
under the jurisdiction of the United States.24 The Act also ap-
annual dolphin mortality rate of over 300,000 attributed to the U.S. fleet alone.
Mayer & Hoch, supra note 9, at 198 nn.75-76.
17. McDorman, supra note 4, at 490.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994). The statute provides:
[there shall be a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine
mammals and marine mammal products ... during which time no per-
mit may be issued for the taking of any marine mammal and no marine
mammal or marine mammal product may be imported into the United
States except [in the enumerated cases].
Id.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994). This exception states that "[miarine
mammals may be taken incidentally in the course of commercial fishing opera-
tions and permits may be issued therefore under section 1374 of this title." Id.
20. Id. The statute provides:
it shall be the immediate goal that the incidental kill or incidental seri-
ous injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of commercial
fishing operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero
mortality and serious injury rate; provided that this goal shall be satis-
fied in the case of the incidental taking of marine mammals in the
course of purse seine fishing for yellowfin tuna by a continuation of the
application of the best possible marine mammal safety techniques and
equipment that are economically and technologically practicable.
Id. (emphasis added).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(A) (1994).
22. Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Re-
newed Attention to the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment,
18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 390 (1993). The procedure by which "incidental
take" permits are issued is codified at Regulations Governing the Taking and
Importing of Marine Mammals, 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (1992). Spracker & Lund-
sgaard, supra at 390 n.23.
23. Spracker & Lundsgaard, supra note 22, at 390.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2) (1994). The Act defines "waters under the juris-
diction of the United States" as:
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plies to takings on the high seas by any persons or vessels which
are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 25 In addition, the MMPA re-
quires that foreign producers of tuna exported to the United
States conform to the standards set by the U.S. tuna fleet.26 As
initially enacted, this provision used discretionary language
relating to enforcement and was not strictly applied against for-
eign vessels.27 Many U.S. tuna boats subsequently avoided com-
pliance by reflagging under foreign sails.28 As a result, while
incidental killings by U.S. tuna fishing vessels decreased after
implementation of the MMPA, dolphin deaths by foreign tuna
fleets increased substantially. 29
Congress recognized that foreign fleets caused the majority
of dolphin deaths in the ETP and that foreign tuna fishermen
had gained a comparative advantage over American tuna fisher-
men due to their countries' less stringent dolphin conservation
policies.30 In response, Congress attempted to increase foreign
compliance with the MMPA's requirements by amending the
MMPA to require an embargo of tuna from any nation whose
dolphin kill rate was significantly greater than that of the
(A) the territorial sea of the United States, and
(B) the waters included within a zone, contiguous to the territorial sea
of the United States, of which the inner boundary is a line coterminous
with the seaward boundary of each coastal State, and the outer bound-
ary is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nauti-
cal miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.
16 U.S.C. § 1362(15)(A) and (B) (1994).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1) (1994).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994).
27. Mayer & Hoch, supra note 9, at 204. The NMFS was reluctant to en-
force the regulations due to protests from the tuna industry and foreign nations
that the regulations were unacceptable. Id. at 205.
28. Id. at 203 (citing David Phillips, Statement on the Implications of the
GATT Panel Ruling on Dolphin Protection and the Environment, before the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Energy and Com-
merce Committee 4 (Sept. 27, 1991) (transcript on file with author)).
29. Id. at 204. In 1972, when the MMPA was enacted, foreign tuna fleets
caused less than 15% of the dolphin deaths in the ETP; by 1989 this percentage
had risen to 80%. Id. at 204 n.126. The increase in dolphin mortality among
foreign tuna fleets resulted both from an increase in the number of fishing ves-
sels and because these nations extended their coastal water jurisdiction. JAMES
JOSEPH, PH.D, FACT SHEET, (Apr. 1993) (on file with Minnesota Journal of
Global Trade) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. As these nations' fishing fleets in-
creased in number, their dolphin kill levels increased correspondingly.
30. At the Hearings on Reauthorization of the MMPA, Senator Breaux
noted that "[tihe problem is not with our tuna industry. The problem is with
the foreign fishermen, who take four times more porpoises than our industry
does." Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F.Supp. 964, 968 (N.D.Cal.
1990), aff'd 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Hearings on Reauthorization
of the MMPA, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988) (statement of Senator Breaux).
1996]
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United States.3 ' Nations exporting tuna to the United States
were also required to conform to U.S. standards by providing ev-
idence that they had adopted a comparable program regarding
the taking of marine mammals in the course of tuna harvest-
ing.3 2 The incidental taking of dolphins was to be monitored by
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) 3 or an
equivalent observer program.3 4
The MMPA amendments also imposed a secondary embargo
on yellowfin tuna exported to the United States. 35 This provi-
sion attempted to preclude nations against which a primary em-
bargo was imposed from circumventing the embargo by simply
exporting their tuna products to an intermediary nation as a
stepping stone to the United States. In order to avoid an em-
bargo on their exports to the United States, such intermediary
nations were required to provide proof that they had acted to
prohibit tuna imports from nations whose direct exports of tuna
had been banned under the Act.36
The final major change brought about by the amendments
was the addition of the requirement that the Secretary of Com-
merce notify the President within six months of the imposition
of any embargo on a country's tuna products.37 The significance
of the notification is that it invokes the Pelly Amendment to the
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967.38 The Pelly Amendment au-
thorizes the President to ban all fish products from any country
whose policies diminish the effectiveness of any international
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(II) (1994). Foreign nations' dolphin kill rates
could not exceed twice the U.S. rate for the period before 1989 and 1.25 times
the U.S. rate in 1990 and thereafter. Id. In addition, incidental kill rates for
the eastern spinner and coastal spotted dolphins were limited to fifteen and two
percent, respectively, of the total incidental kills in the ETP. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2)(B)(III) (1994).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(I) (1994).
33. For a discussion of the IATTC and its activities, see infra part II.B.2.
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(IV) (1994). Whatever program of observation
was implemented, it had to provide a level of observer coverage equal to that
imposed upon U.S. vessels. Pedrozo, supra note 9, at 90 n.75. Foreign vessels
were not required to adhere to the U.S. observer standard if their program was
"determined to provide sufficiently reliable documentary evidence of the na-
tion's incidental take rate." Id.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (1994).
36. Id. Failure to comply with these requirements would result in an em-
bargo against tuna exports from the intermediary nation without regard to
whether that nation's own fishermen complied with U.S. regulatory guidelines.
Id.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D) (1994).
38. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994).
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fisheries conservation program. 39 Thus, under the new MMPA,
a nation which resisted U.S. pressure to change its tuna har-
vesting methods risked a complete ban of all of its fish exports to
the United States.
Despite these attempts to extend the MMPA's international
effect, no import bans had been imposed on any nation as of
1990 nor had the Secretary of the Treasury reported on the com-
parability of tuna exporters' dolphin protection programs. 40
Thus, there had been no indication that the provisions of the
MMPA were being enforced. In response to this inaction by the
government, Earth Island Institute brought suit in federal
court.41 On August 28, 1990, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the Institute's request
for a preliminary injunction enjoining tuna imports from Ecua-
dor, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela until adequate comparabil-
ity findings had been made.42 Pursuant to favorable findings by
the Commerce Department, the restriction was removed from
Mexico, Venezuela and Vanuatu on September 7, and later from
Ecuador and Panama when they prohibited their tuna fleets
from setting on dolphin. 43 Earth Island Institute then issued
another challenge, this time alleging that the NMFS had incor-
rectly applied the MMPA in finding that Mexico had not violated
the eastern spinner dolphin limits. 44 The District Court issued
a temporary restraining order on October 10, 1990 which was
converted to a preliminary injunction banning imports from
Mexico on October 19. 45 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
stayed the embargo on November 14, but the embargo against
39. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1994). The ban may be continued for any dura-
tion which the President deems appropriate. Id.
40. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F.Supp. 964, 968
(N.D.Cal.1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
41. Id. Earth Island Institute is a national, non-profit corporation based in
San Francisco, whose members share a commitment to the protection of marine
mammals. Id. at 966.
42. Id.
43. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States - Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, BISD 39th Supp. 155 (1991), reprinted at 30 I.L.M. 1594, para.
2.7 [hereinafter Tuna I].
44. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 (9th Cir.
1991). The dispute concerned the time period for calculation of eastern spinner
dolphin mortality. Id. at 1451. The NMFS had based its comparability findings
on statistics for the first six months of 1990 only. Id. The Earth Island Insti-
tute asserted that comparability findings were to be made on a yearly basis,
thus rendering the NMFS's finding invalid. Id.
45. Spracker & Lundsgaard, supra note 22, at 393. The district court held
that the regulation allowing "reconsideration" of the 1989 embargo based on
only six months of 1990 data violated the language and purpose of the statute
1996] 253
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Mexican tuna imports went into effect when the stay was lifted
on February 22, 1991.46
II. THE FIRST TUNA - DOLPHIN DECISION
On November 5, 1990, Mexico requested consultations with
the United States concerning the tuna import restrictions. 47
When the two countries failed to reach an agreement, Mexico
requested creation of a dispute panel to examine the matter
under Article XXIII(2) of the GATT. 48 In determining whether
the MMPA conflicted with the GATT, the panel examined
whether the ban constituted a "quantitative restriction" prohib-
ited by Article XI of the GATT 49 or an "internal regulation" sub-
ject to Article III (4).50 The panel determined that Article III did
which, in the court's opinion, required a full year's data. Earth Island Institute,
929 F.2d at 1451.
46. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 2.7. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted the government's motion for an emergency stay pending appeal and
expedited the appeal. Earth Island Institute, 929 F.2d at 1452 n.3. The stay
was lifted at the time of the appeal. Id.
47. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 1.1. The GATT dispute settlement
mechanism requires signatories to "make their best efforts to reach a mutually
satisfactory solution" before requesting establishment of a dispute resolution
panel. GATT, Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD 26th Supp. 56-
83, at Article 17 (1980).
48. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 1.1. Under GATT Article XXIII(2), "[i]f
no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties con-
cerned within a reasonable time ... the matter may be referred to [a GATT
dispute resolution panel]." GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII(2). The GATT
charges its dispute settlement panels with hearing the complaints of one mem-
ber country against another, reaching a conclusion based on each side's testi-
mony, and submitting a report to the GATT Council for possible adoption.
Mayer & Hoch, supra note 9, at 206-07. Until the first tuna-dolphin dispute,
the Council had never failed to adopt a panel report. Id.
49. GATT Article XI (1) provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions.. . whether made effective through quo-
tas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product
of the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 1, at art. XI (1).
50. GATT Article III (4) provides:
The products of any territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment
no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their in-
ternal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use.
GATT, supra note 1, at art. III (4). Thus, under this provision, the United
States could place regulations on imported tuna once it was in the United
States, as long as domestically produced tuna was subject to the same treat-
254 [Vol. 5:247
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not apply and that both the primary and secondary embargo
provisions violated the GATT's ban on quantitative
restrictions. 51
A. ANALYSIS OF THE PANEL DECISION
The panel first categorized the import restriction as a regu-
lation of the process by which a product is manufactured, rather
than a regulation of the product per se. The panel determined
that Article III only permits a country to regulate a product as a
product; it does not allow a country to regulate the process
which results in the product. 52 Since the fishing prohibitions
imposed by the MMPA were not based on differentiations of
tuna as a product, and absent a U. S. contention to the contrary,
the panel found that the restriction violated Article XI.53
The panel then examined U.S. assertions that the MMPA
provision was justified under Article XX.54 The United States
argued that the tuna ban was justified both by Article XX (b),
which provides an exception for measures "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health," and by Article XX (g),
which provides an exception for regulations "relating to the con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources."55 The panel re-
jected each of these arguments.
With respect to Article XX(b), the panel concluded that
measures such as the MMPA could not be applied outside of the
imposing nation's jurisdiction.56 Because the exception was am-
biguous as to extra-jurisdictional application, the panel chose to
construe it narrowly in order to limit conflicts with the GATT's
broader purposes. 57 Moreover, the panel found that the tuna
ment. Because the applied standards which determined whether a ban would
be imposed were by definition comparable to those applied to domestic tuna, the
United States argued that the "national treatment" requirement was satisfied.
51. Tuna I, supra note 43, at paras. 5.18, 5.36.
52. Id. at para. 5.11. Tuna I was the first GATT panel report to make such
a product - process distinction. See Mayer & Hoch, supra note 9, at 210-11.
53. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 5.18.
54. Article XX of the GATT provides exceptions to the general prohibition
on restrictive trade measures, where such measures are necessary to pursue
public policy objectives including: protection of public morals; protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health; compliance with other laws or regula-
tions; measures relating to products of prison labor; protection of national artis-
tic or historic treasures; and conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
GATT, supra note 1, at art. XX.
55. Id.
56. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 5.26.
57. Id. The GATT's broadest and primary purpose is to facilitate trade.
See supra note 2. The panel noted that in a previous draft, exception (b) read:
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ban did not meet Article XX(b)'s necessity requirement"8 be-
cause the alternative method of international cooperation was
available to the United States.5 9
The panel used similar reasoning in its evaluation of Article
XX(g), noting that the extra-jurisdictional application sought by
the United States would allow contracting parties to "unilater-
ally determine the conservation policies from which other con-
tracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their
rights under the General Agreement."60 The panel found that
even in the absence of the extrajurisdictionality issue, the U.S.
measures would not meet the standard for Article XX(g) due to
the MMPA's unpredictable standards for compliance. 61 The
MMPA linked the maximum dolphin kill rate for other countries
for a particular period to the actual dolphin kill rate of U.S.
boats for the same period. As a result, foreign fisherman did not
know whether their policies conformed to those of the United
States until after the period had passed, thus rendering compli-
ance impossible. The panel found that such unpredictable con-
ditions could not be regarded as primarily aimed at the
conservation of dolphins. 62
The panel disposed of three other issues rather quickly.
First, in considering the intermediary import ban, the panel
noted that it existed solely as a means by which to enforce the
"[flor the purpose of protecting, human, animal, or plant life or health, if corre-
sponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing
country." Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 5.26 (emphasis added). The panel
interpreted this language to indicate that the purpose of the exception was to
safeguard the life or health of humans, animals or plants only within the juris-
diction of the importing country. Id.
58. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XX (b). Article XX (b) provides an excep-
tion for any measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health." Id. The Tuna I panel found that the United States had not exhausted
all options reasonably available to pursue dolphin protection objectives through
measures consistent with the GATT. In particular, the panel noted that the
United States should have sought negotiation of international cooperative ar-
rangements. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 5.28.
59. Id. at para. 5.28. The panel apparently determined that the 60-day
stalemate which resulted under the GATT-mandated negotiation period was an
insufficient amount of time to pursue cooperative means of dispute resolution.
The panel gave no indication, however, as to what would constitute a proper
duration for such negotiations. In addition, the panel overlooked repeated ef-
forts by the United States to negotiate international conservation agreements.
See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
60. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para 5.32.
61. Id. at para. 5.33.
62. Id.
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direct import ban.63 The panel then concluded that since the
direct import ban was inconsistent with the GATT, so too was
the intermediary ban.6 4 Second, the panel considered the possi-
ble use of the Pelly Amendment to impose broader import re-
strictions. 65 The panel noted that the Pelly Amendment did not
require the President to impose such a ban, but left the decision
to his discretion.6 6 Although such action, if taken, may violate
the GATT, the panel found that legislation which merely permit-
ted such action did not itself constitute a violation.67 Thus,
because the Pelly Amendment did not require trade measures to
be taken, the panel found that it did not violate the GATT.68
The final issue the panel considered was the validity of the
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act of 1990
(DPCIA).6 9 The DPCIA states that it is a violation of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act 70 to label any tuna product "dolphin
safe" that is exported to or offered for sale in the United States if
purse seine nets or driftnets were used in harvesting the tuna.7 1
The panel noted that the DPCIA applied equally to all nations
fishing for tuna and that it did not restrict the sale of tuna prod-
ucts, but only their labeling.72 Thus, any possible advantage
from displaying the label resulted entirely from consumer pref-
erence and not from the labeling provision itself.73 For these
reasons, the panel found that the DPCIA was consistent with
U.S. obligations under the GATT.
B. U.S. RESPONSES TO THE FIRST TUNA - DOLPHIN DECISION
Despite the approval of the DPCIA and the fact that Tuna I
has not been adopted, 74 the panel report alarmed environmen-
63. Id. at para. 5.40.
64. Id.
65. Id. at para. 5.20. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (discussing
the Pelly Amendment).
66. Tuna. I, supra note 43, at para. 5.20.
67. Id. at para. 5.21.
68. Id.
69. Id. at paras. 5.41-5.44. The DPCIA is found at 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp.
II 1990).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1) (Supp. II 1990).
72. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 5.42.
73. Id.
74. Since 1968, panel reports have been adopted by the GATT Council on
behalf of the Contracting Parties or directly by the Contracting Parties at their
annual Session. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAw AND PRACTICE
708 ( 6th ed. 1994). At the March, 1981 Council Meeting, the Council Chairman
noted that the Council normally makes its decisions by consensus. Id. In his
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tal groups who characterized the ruling as the paradigm exam-
ple of the disastrous effect of free trade agreements on the
environment.7 5 Pressure from environmental groups and the
general public76 prompted Representative Barbara Boxer of Cal-
ifornia 77 and sixty-two other members of Congress to write a
letter to the President and the U.S. Trade Representative indi-
cating that they would not support any attempt to repeal the
laws that the Tuna I panel found to be inconsistent with the
GATT. 78 Because a GATT ruling amounts to no more than a
suggestion that a country amend its laws to conform with the
panel's findings, this opposition to the panel report by members
of Congress was quite significant. 79 The Bush administration
subsequently sought a way to address these environmental con-
cerns and comply with the GATT.
1. Attempts by the Bush Administration to Lift the Import
Ban
Shortly after the GATT panel announced its findings, the
United States and Mexico agreed that Mexico would not seek to
have the panel decision adopted. 80 The two nations then com-
view, consensus was understood in GATT to mean that no delegation objected
to a text or attempted to prevent its adoption. Id. Because Mexico did not place
the Tuna I panel report before the Council or the Contracting Parties for adop-
tion, it has not been subjected to this process.
75. See, e.g., Environmental Group Says GATT Tuna Report Could Have
Disastrous Conservation Impact, 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1325 (Sept. 11, 1991).
76. One method environmental groups used to protest dolphin-unsafe fish-
ing practices was organizing consumers to boycott canned tuna that was not
dolphin-safe. Pedrozo, supra note 9, at 90. In response to the public relations
problems caused by these boycotts, the three largest U.S. tuna producers imple-
mented voluntary plans under which they would purchase only dolphin-safe
tuna for the U.S. market. Id. Although these events occurred before the Tuna I
panel issued its report, they contributed significantly to Congress' reaction to
the panel decision.
77. Barbara Boxer, author of the DPCIA, has since been elected Senator.
78. Members of Congress Protest Recent GATT Ruling on U.S. Embargo of
Mexican Tuna, 8 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1399 (Sept. 25, 1991).
79. Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 479, 507-08 (1990).
Even assuming that the GATT has become U.S. law, only U.S. laws enacted
before 1947 will be trumped by the GATT because of the later-in-time rule. Id.
at 508. According to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, it will be up to
Congress and other interested parties in the United States to decide what, if
any, legislative action is appropriate. Kantor Says United States Will Ask for
Full Review in Tuna - Dolphin Ruling, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 814, 815 (May
25, 1994).
80. Mexico Agrees to Defer Action on Complaint on U.S. Tuna Embargo, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1351 (Sept. 18, 1991). Mexico's failure to press for adop-
[Vol. 5:247
TUNA ,DLPHIN II
menced negotiations aimed at promoting dolphin conservation
in the ETP.81 In exchange for Mexico's promise of increased
dolphin conservation measures,8 2 the Bush Administration
promised to seek legislation lifting the tuna import ban.8 3 The
Administration subsequently proposed legislation "aimed at pro-
moting international dolphin protection and resolving the GATT
issue, by lifting the MMPA ban against any country that agreed
to a five year moratorium on setting on dolphin."8 4 This legisla-
tive proposal was eventually enacted as the International
Dolphin Conservation Act (IDCA) of 1992.85
The IDCA amended the MMPA by adding Subchapter IV -
Global Moratorium To Prohibit Certain Tuna Harvesting Prac-
tices.8 6 This provision authorizes the Secretary of State to enter
into international agreements to prohibit the harvesting of tuna'
by encircling dolphins or other marine mammals with purse
seine nets.8 7 Agreements reached under the IDCA must also: (1)
establish an international research program to develop alterna-
tive methods to harvest tuna in light of the moratorium; (2) re-
quire each party to the agreement to take all necessary steps to
comply with the moratorium; and (3) encourage each party to
persuade other tuna fishing nations to become parties to the
agreement.88 Once such an agreement has been reached, the re-
search program must continually work toward developing fish-
ing methods that are safer for dolphins.8 9 Vessels participating
in the research program must carry an observer and at least half
tion of the panel report is almost certainly due to the negative effects of such
action on the future of NAFTA. Id.
81. Frances Willaims, U.S. Nears Tuna Deal with Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
19, 1992, at 3.
82. Immediately following the issuance of the Panel's report, Mexican Pres-
ident Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced that Mexico would allow interna-
tional observers on all of Mexico's tuna fishing boats. Juanita Darling, Tuna
Turnabout: Mexico Announces a Dolphin Protection Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1991, at D6.
83. Steve Charnovitz, Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT
Panel Report, 24 ENVT'L. L. REP. 10,567, 10,571 (1994).
84. Musgrave & Stevens, supra note 12, at 969. According to one House
member, the proposed legislation "resolves the GATT problem by removing the
comparability standards and immediately lifting the embargo." Id. at 969 n.76
(citation omitted).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1411 (1994).
86. Id.
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1994). The Act requires such agreements to be of
at least five year durations. Id.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1412(b) (1994).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1413 (1994).
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of all observers must be supervised by a "competent regional
organization."90
The IDCA also contains provisions for trade sanctions if a
country fails to comply with a moratorium to which it agreed.91
The Act requires the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, to periodically determine whether obli-
gated countries have adhered to the moratorium's terms. 92 If a
country violates the moratorium, the Secretary of Treasury
must notify the President and Congress and then ban all tuna
imports from that country. 93 If the country whose tuna imports
have been banned does not certify within sixty days that it has
complied with the moratorium, the IDCA requires the President
to implement a ban of other fish products totaling forty per cent
of fish exports from that country.94 This ban remains in effect
until the Secretary of State determines that the country has im-
plemented the agreement. 95
The IDCA adopts the "dolphin safe" standard of the DPCIA
and gives it greater effect. Since June 1, 1994, it has been un-
lawful under the IDCA for any person to sell, purchase, offer for
sale, transport or ship in the United States any tuna or tuna
product that is not "dolphin safe."96 Although the IDCA deter-
mines compliance using a ship-by-ship rather than a country-by-
country basis, the Act still does not bring the U.S. legislation
into conformity with the GATT due to its provisions for the im-
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3) (1994). For the ETP, "competent regional organ-
ization" is defined as the IAITC. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(17) (1994).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(2) (1994).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1414 (1994).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (1994).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1994). The statute provides:
The one or more fish and fish product categories to which the President
imposes an import ban under subparagraph (A) with respect to a coun-
try must be a fish and fish product category or categories with respect
to which the articles classified thereunder and imported from that
country in the base year had an aggregate customs valuation equal to
40 percent of the aggregate customs valuation of all articles classified
under all fish and fish product categories that were imported from that
country during the base year.
16 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(2)(B) (1994).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1416(b)(3) (1994). The Secretary determines that a country
is in compliance with its obligations under the agreement based upon a formal
communication in which the country commits itself to the agreement's terms.
Id.
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1417(a)(1) (1994). "Dolphin safe" has been defined for the
ETP as tuna harvested by methods other than setting on dolphin or other
marine mammals, or harvested on the high seas using drift nets. See supra text
accompanying note 71.
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position of unilateral trade sanctions by the United States. 97
The Act nevertheless represents a significant effort by the
United States toward resolution of the GATT problems through
the use of multilateral agreements.
2. The IATTC and U.S. Efforts to Reach a Multilateral
Solution
The Tuna - Dolphin Panel Report condemned the MMPA for
unilaterally imposing U.S. environmental policies on other na-
tions98 and failed to acknowledge repeated attempts by the
Unites States to negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements
with other nations engaged in fishing practices that were harm-
ful to dolphins. 99 The United States had unsuccessfully sought
an international agreement for dolphin protection since the
1970's.100 The failure of these efforts prompted the U.S. govern-
ment to ask the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC) to address the problem. 1° 1 The specific objectives of the
IATTC's involvement were: (1) to estimate the levels of dolphin
mortality caused by the Eastern Pacific fishing fleet; (2) to as-
sess the impact of these mortalities on the dolphin populations;
and (3) to develop methods and procedures to reduce mortal-
ity. 10 2 While this effort was eventually successful, 10 3 there is
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(2) (1994).
98. Tuna I, supra note 43, at para. 5.32.
99. See Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 10,570-71.
100. Id. Early efforts focused on organizing international conferences on
marine mammal conservation. Id.
101. The IATTC is an international research organization based at Scripps
Institute of Oceanography in La Jolla, California, that is responsible for the
study and conservation of tunas in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. FACT SHEET,
supra note 29, at 1. The United States has provided the majority of the finan-
cial support for the IATTC's dolphin conservation program as well as technical
assistance to underdeveloped countries to implement dolphin-safe fishing meth-
ods. Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 10,571.
102. Id. Proposed alternatives to purse-seine fishing have included:
separating tunas and dolphins prior to encirclement, using acoustic
stimuli, prey, or other stimuli .... Using paired-trawls to capture
tunas associated with dolphin without encirclement .... Initiat[ing]
tracking and other behavioral studies of tunas and dolphins.... Locat-
ing large yellowfin tuna with [Fish Aggregation Devices] FADs, light
detecting and ranging devices (LIDAR) or other optical sensors, and
aggregating tunas with bait [and] . .. predicting the spatial distribu-
tion and catchability of large yellowfin tuna with oceanographic data.
Pedrozo, supra note 9, at 98 n.128 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 21,081 (1992)).
103. The IATTC estimated that 133,000 dolphins were killed in the ETP in
1986, the first year in which the program was fully operational. FACT SHEET,
supra note 29, at 1. The IATTC subsequently accelerated its studies of the im-
pact of this mortality level on overall dolphin populations and intensified its
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debate as to whether the IATTC's success could have occurred if
the United States had not also imposed trade sanctions.10 4
As part of its efforts, the IATTC organized negotiations
among member nations to reach a consensus as to how to limit
dolphin mortality. 10 5 In April 1992, the participating nations
agreed to place observers on large tuna fishing vessels and
pledged to reduce overall dolphin mortality to less than 5,000 by
1999.106 The United States actively participated in these nego-
tiations which occurred at the same time that the GATT Panel
was deliberating the first tuna-dolphin dispute.' 0 7 Mexico, by
contrast, had quit the IATTC in 1978, shortly after the Commis-
sion began to study tuna-dolphin interactions.108 Despite the
IATTC's efforts to reach a cooperative, multinational resolution
to the issue of dolphin mortality, the MMPA remained a point of
contention and was soon subjected to another round of GATT
scrutiny.
III. TUNA II: THE EU - NETHERLANDS COMPLAINT
The Tuna I Panel Report declared both the primary and sec-
ondary embargoes of the MMPA illegal under the GATT. 10 9
Although Mexico negotiated with the United States to end the
efforts to encourage the use of more dolphin-friendly fishing methods. Id. at 2.
As a result of the increasing use of these techniques, estimates of overall
dolphin mortality fell to 100,000 in 1987; less than 85,000 in 1988; 27,000 in
1991; and 15,500 in 1992. Id. at 2-3.
104. See James Brooke, Ten Nations Reach Accord on Saving Dolphins, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1992, at C4.
105. FACT SHEET, supra note 29, at 2.
106. Id. The agreement imposed rigid kill limits for each fishing boat, which
were to be verified by observers who would accompany each vessel on every
fishing excursion. Id. Any vessel in violation of the kill limits would incur se-
vere, uniform sanctions by its home nation. Id. The program also established
an international review panel and charged the IATTC with establishing a re-
search program to develop new fishing practices that could be implemented in
place of setting on dolphin. Id.
The parties to the agreement were Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, the United States, Vanuatu and Venezuela.
Pedrozo, supra note 9, at 82 n.25. Mexico and Venezuela initially refused to
join the IATTC, but under pressure caused by bad publicity and dropping ex-
ports, both nations agreed to allow IATTC observers on their fishing vessels and
pledged money for scientific research. Brooke, supra note 104, at C4.
107. Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 10,571.
108. Id. Mexico's purported reason for leaving was a conflict over fishing
rights. Id. The Commission began its work with tuna and dolphins in 1976. Id.
at 10,571 n.44 Although Mexico has announced plans to rejoin the IATTC, it
has yet to do so. Id. at 10,571.
109. See supra part 11A.
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primary embargo of its products, the countries affected by the
secondary embargo found this to be an unsatisfactory method of
obtaining relief. This prompted the European Union (EU) 110
and the Netherlands to file a new complaint with the GATT, in
July 1992, seeking to invalidate the secondary embargo which
affected them."' In November 1992, the EU requested that the
panel postpone its consideration of the issue due to pending U.S.
legislation - the IDCA.112 In February 1993, after reviewing
the IDCA's provision regarding termination of the primary em-
bargo, the EU requested that the panel resume its delibera-
tions. 1 3 The Tuna II panel deliberated for over 18 months
before reaching its decision.' 14
Although the Tuna II panel ultimately found that the
MMPA's embargo provisions violated the GATT, its reasoning
differed significantly from that of the first panel. The Tuna II
panel reasoned similarly to the Tuna I panel in finding that Ar-
ticle III did not apply and that the MMPA violated Article XI. 1 1
Having found that the MMPA violated GATT Article XI, the
panel turned to U.S. arguments that the Act could be justified as
110. Ironically, the EU has banned imports of fur obtained from animals
captured by leg-hold traps which "do not meet internationally agreed humane
trapping standards." See Council Regulation 3254/91, 1991 O.J. (L 308) cited in
William J. Snape, III & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching for GATs Environmen-
tal Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting "Due Process?," 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 777, 791 n.89 (1994). Thus, while the EU sought to overturn the MMPA in
the name of free trade, it took affirmative steps to block trade in the interest of
the humane treatment of animals. Id.
111. The secondary embargo provision of the MMPA affected, among other
nations, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands Antilles. GATT Dispute Set-
tlement Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994), re-
printed at 33 I.L.M. 839, paras. 2.13, 2.15 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna II].
112. Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 10,572.
113. Id.
114. Id. GATT panels normally issue decisions within six months. Id. This
decision may have been delayed for political reasons. Id. at 10,572 n.65.
115. Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.8. Although the EU did not allege
that Article III applied to the complaint nor did the United States attempt to
defend the MMPA under Article III, the panel declined to merely agree with the
EU that the Article did not apply. Instead, the panel reiterated the Tuna I
panel's discussion that the Article related to the regulation of products as prod-
ucts, not the process by which they are produced. Id. Because the MMPA dis-
tinguished between harvesting practices and tuna importing policies of
exporting countries, and because these practices and policies could not affect
the tuna as a product, the panel declared that Article III did not apply. Id. at
para. 5.9. The Tuna II panel also used the same line of reasoning as the first
panel in its analysis of Article XI; the panel found that the import prohibitions
were not "duties, taxes or other charges," and thus violated Article XI. Id. at
para. 5.10.
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an Article XX exception. The United States invoked three Arti-
cle XX sections.
With respect to Article XX(g),1 16 the panel applied a three-
step analysis. First, it considered whether the policy was meant
to conserve an exhaustible natural resource and was made effec-
tive in conjunction with domestic restrictions. 11 7 Second, the
panel considered whether the trade measure was "related to"
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." 8 The third
step involved an inquiry as to whether the measure was applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where similar con-
ditions exist or in a manner which would constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade.1 9 The panel never reached
the third step due to its dispositive finding with respect to the
second step.
Noting that dolphin stocks could potentially be exhausted,
the Tuna II panel accepted the U.S. argument that a policy to
conserve dolphins was a policy to conserve an exhaustible natu-
ral resource. 120 Unlike the Tuna I panel, the Tuna II panel
found that the rationale of a policy to conserve an exhaustible
natural resource did not depend on the current depletion of that
resource.' 2 ' Thus, the fact that dolphin populations in the ETP
were not presently endangered did not preclude their classifica-
tion as an exhaustible natural resource.122
In analyzing what measures a country may take in attempt-
ing to conserve exhaustible natural resources, the panel's logic
shifted dramatically from previous GATT analyses. For the first
time, a GATT panel observed that Article XX (g) contains no
limit on extraterritorial application. Contrary to the EU's asser-
tion, the panel stated that Article XX(g) does not prohibit a
country from applying resource conservation measures beyond
116. Article XX (g) provides an exception for measures "relating to the con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources if such measure are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." GATT,
supra note 1, at art. XX (g).
117. Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.12.
118. Id.
119. Id. Each Article XX exception must meet this standard, which is con-
tained in the Article's headnote. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XX.
120. Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.13.
121. Id. The first panel had not reached this issue due to its invalidation of
the MMPA on the basis of its extrajurisdictional application. See supra text
accompanying notes 60-62.
122. Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.13.
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its borders. 123 Thus, the Tuna II panel explicitly rejected the
Tuna I panel's conclusion that extrajurisdictional measures
were contrary to the GATT.124
In considering the second prong of its analysis, the panel
noted that a previous GATT panel had defined the term "related
to" as "primarily aimed at."125 The panel then examined
whether the U.S. measures were "primarily aimed at" their ex-
pressed goal of dolphin conservation. The panel noted that the
United States prohibited the importation of any tuna from inter-
mediary countries whether or not the particular tuna was har-
vested in a manner which was unsafe to dolphins and whether
or not the country itself had tuna harvesting practices or policies
which were of actual or potential harm to dolphins.' 26 Imports
would be banned as long as that country imported some of its
tuna from another country which had unacceptable tuna har-
vesting policies.127 The panel observed that both the primary
and intermediary embargoes attempted to coerce other nations
to change their policies with regard to persons and things within
their own jurisdictions. 128 Conservation of dolphins could not be
effected without such a change.' 29 Thus, the statute was pri-
marily aimed at bringing about changes in other countries'
internal regulations rather than directly addressing issues of
dolphin conservation. The panel concluded that measures
taken to force other countries to change their policies, and that
were effective only if such changes occurred, could not be pri-
marily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural re-
source in accordance with the meaning of Article XX (g).1 30
The panel also used three-step analysis in its consideration
of whether the MMPA could be justified as an Article XX(b) ex-
ception. The first issue for consideration was whether the policy
fell within the range of policies to protect the life of humans,
animals or plants. The panel first noted that the parties did not
disagree that the protection of dolphin life or health was a policy
123. Id. at para. 5.15.
124. Id. at para. 5.20.
125. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, Canada - Measures affecting the Ex-
ports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, BISD 35th Supp. 98 (1988) para. 4.6,
cited in Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.22. That panel noted that the basis
for the "primarily aimed at" test was whether the restrictive trade measures
would have been adopted for conservation reasons alone. Id.
126. Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.23.
127. Id.
128. Id. at para. 5.24.
129. Id.
130. Id. at para. 5.27.
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that could fall under Article XX(b).' 3 ' The sole dispute in this
respect was whether extrajurisdictional application of the policy
was permissible. Referring to its reasoning under Article XX(g),
the panel reiterated that the General Agreement's provisions
could be given extra-territorial application. 13 2
In step two, the panel addressed the question of whether the
measure was "necessary" to protect human, animal or plant life
or health. The panel utilized a definition of "necessary" which
required a party to use "among the measures reasonably avail-
able to it, [the measure] which entails the least degree of incon-
sistency with other GATT provisions."133 Consistent with its
analysis under Article XX(g), the panel noted that both the pri-
mary and intermediate embargoes constituted an attempt to
force other nations to conform their domestic policies to those
advocated by the United States. 34 This proved particularly
problematic in the case of the secondary embargo because the
domestic policies which the United States sought to change were
not those of the country upon which the embargo was imposed,
but those of a third country from which the intermediary coun-
try had imported the tuna.13 5 In the absence of such a change in
a foreign producer's internal policies, the U.S. policies could not
further U.S. environmental conservation objectives. The panel
again declined to consider the third requirement of compliance
with the Article XX headnote because an essential condition of
Article XX(b) had not been met.' 36
Finally, the United States attempted to justify the secon-
dary embargo under Article XX (d), which excepts measures nec-
essary to secure compliance with another law or regulation
which is not itself inconsistent with the GATT.137 Since the pri-
mary embargo was not consistent with the GATT, the panel con-
131. Id. at para. 5.30.
132. Id. at para. 5.32. Recalling its observation that:
elsewhere in the General Agreement measures according different
treatment to products of different origins could in principle be taken
with respect to things located, or actions occurring, outside the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure. [The panel noted
that] [iut could not therefore be said that the General Agreement pro-
scribed in an absolute manner such measures.
Id.
133. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, Thailand - Restrictions on Importa-
tion of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, BISD 37th Supp. 200 (1990), para. 74,
cited in Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.35.
134. Tuna II, supra note 111, at paras. 5.36-37.
135. Id. at para. 5.36.
136. Id. at para. 5.39.
137. Id. at paras. 5.40-41.
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cluded that it could not serve as a basis by which to justify the
secondary embargo under Article XX(d).' 3 8
Since the objective of sustainable development 39 has been
widely accepted by the parties to the GATT, the validity of the
U.S. objective of protecting dolphins was not questioned., 40 The
issue was whether, in pursuance of this objective, the United
States could impose trade sanctions to coerce other countries to
change their internal policies which could in turn affect tuna
fishing and dolphin safety.' 41 The panel concluded that the
MMPA's non-conformity with the GATT could not be justified
under an Article XX exception.' 42 Thus, the Tuna II panel
reached the same ultimate result as its predecessor, although it
followed a somewhat different path to that end. That path left a
significant opening through which future environmental policies
may be directed in order to be upheld under Article XX.
By singling out the MMPA's effect on national policies as its
downfall, the Tuna II panel indicated that the Act could stand
despite its extraterritorial application if the United States refor-
mulated it to take a more direct approach. Under this rationale,
a policy could survive GATT scrutiny if it were aimed directly at
dolphin conservation, rather than coerced change in another na-
tion's policy which could in turn affect dolphin conservation.
The second Tuna panel report eliminated a substantial bar-
rier to reconciling the goals of trade and environmental groups
by acknowledging dolphin conservation as a legitimate objective
to conserve an exhaustible natural resource 43 The panel
merely found the measures taken by the United States to be in-
sufficiently linked to that objective. Even more importantly, a
policy can be applied outside of U.S. territory under Tuna II.
This change in GATT reasoning is the most significant aspect of
the Tuna II panel decision. It greatly enhances the efficacy of
138. Id. at para. 5.41.
139. Although many alternative definitions for the term "sustainable devel-
opment" have been advanced, the core concept is:
to direct global economic efforts toward increasing the present genera-
tion's quality of life while recognizing two essential principles: (1) the
Earth's finite capacity to accommodate people and industrial develop-
ment; and (2) a moral imperative not to deprive future generations of
natural resources essential to well-being and quality of environment.
Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sustainable Development: Integrating Economics,
Ecology, and Law, 31 WiLLAMrTE L. REV. 261, 262 (1995).
140. Tuna II, supra note 111, at para. 5.42.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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both the MMPA's conservation provisions and conservation ef-
forts generally. By recognizing the significance of dolphin con-
servation measures-and allowing extrajurisdictional application
of such measures, the Tuna II panel greatly increased the ability
of the United States to bring the MMPA into conformity with the
GATT.
IV. IN THE WAKE OF TUNA II
The Tuna I panel decision had little or no impact on U.S.
environmental legislation. This inefficacy resulted largely be-
cause Mexico did not push to have the report adopted.144 While
some have argued that the United States should seek to bring
its laws into compliance with the GATT, environmental groups
have opposed any changes. 145 Despite the apparent willingness
of the Tuna II panel to tolerate modified environmental laws re-
gardless of their extrajurisdictional application, the second deci-
sion met with the same hostility as its predecessor. 146
A. ENVIRONMENTALISTS' REACTIONS TO TUNA II
Although the Tuna II panel acknowledged the validity of ef-
forts to ensure sustainable development, environmental con-
cerns are secondary to economic growth under the GATT. 147
Many environmental groups pointed to the Tuna II decision as
proof that the GATT can undermine U.S. environmental stan-
144. As of the present date, the report has still not been adopted. See supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
145. See infra part IV.A.
146. Bill Snape, trade counsel for Defenders of Wildlife, called the decision a
"clear and lucid example" of why the environmental community is against
GATT. U.S. Seeks Review of Tuna-Dolphin Decision; Ruling Said to Undermine
Environmental Laws, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA), May 25, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, BNAIED file. Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizen's
trade program, said that "[tihis decision is proof positive that environmental
laws are undermined by GATT." Id. David Schorr, a trade policy specialist for
the World Wildlife Fund, called the ruling "wrong-headed and unacceptable,"
and added that the ruling was deeply troubling because it demonstrates the
kind of pressure GATT imposes on U.S. environmental laws. Id.
147. See generally Mayer & Hoch, supra note 9. GATT panelists bring a
narrow, trade-focused perspective to their task, and environmental matters are
often beyond the scope of their interest and expertise. GATT panelists are typi-
cally trade attorneys, law professors, or current government officials drawn
from the GATT community. Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 10,582. Members of
these professions often lack the scientific knowledge to fully appreciate environ-
mental issues. Of the three Tuna II panel members, only one had strong envi-
ronmental credentials. Id. at 10,582 n.219.
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dards.148 Environmentalists encouraged Congress to reject the
Uruguay Round and attempted to stall negotiations toward im-
plementing the World Trade Organization.1 49
Members of Congress have felt additional pressure from
their constituents to protect dolphins. o50 Public sentiment in
this area is so strong that the tuna - dolphin case has been re-
ferred to as "the catalyst for the environmentalist onslaught"
against the GATT and free trade. 51 Because decisions by GATT
panels are not binding, such widespread public opinion is signifi-
cant. Congress gives greater weight to the immediate concerns
of its constituents than to the relatively distant obligations im-
posed by the GATT. Thus, the impact of well-organized environ-
mental lobbying groups and the sheer volume of public opinion
is likely to weigh heavily against any action by Congress to
bring U.S. laws into compliance with the GATT.' 52
B. CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS
Not all groups agree that the MMPA's tuna fishing methods
are the best option, economically or ecologically. Biologists and
fishermen regard the available alternatives as poor substitutes
148. Citizen Trade Campaign Executive Director Jane Danowitz called the
ruling a "dress rehearsal" for what will happen under the new WTO. Kantor
Says United States Will Ask for Full Review in Tuna-Dolphin Ruling, 11 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) 814 (May 25, 1994). U.S. laws banning dangerous pesticide
residues, restrictions on the use of hormones, and restrictions on allowable
levels of toxic chemicals would be at risk under the WTO. Charnovitz, supra
note 83, at 10,582 n.219.
149. Charnovitz, supra note 83, at 10,582.
150. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H9064, 9067 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (state-
ment of Rep. Gerry E. Studds):
No other single wildlife issue has caused more public outrage than this
one. Hundreds of letters, telephone calls, and petitions with thousands
of signatures begging Congress to put a stop to this practice pour into
the office of my Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
each year. They come from virtually every State in the Nation - from
school children, retired steelworkers, and consumers who demand
dolphin-safe tuna in the marketplace.
151. The Greening of Protectionism, ECONoMisT, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25. De-
spite dramatic decreases in dolphin mortality in recent years, many environ-
mentalists remain adamantly opposed to any incidental dolphin deaths in the
ETP. Brad Warren, The Downside of Dolphin-Safe: The Dolphin Will Survive,
but Will the U.S. Tuna Fleet?, AUDUBON, Nov. 1993, at 20.
152. Environmental lobbying efforts were bolstered by the fact that they
were unopposed by conflicting business interests. In April, 1990, the world's
three largest tuna canners (Bumble Bee, StarKist, and Chicken of the Sea)
bowed to public pressure and agreed to stop buying and selling tuna caught
with dolphins. See Dolphin-Safe Tuna is Aim of Bumble Bee Study, L.A.TIMEs,
May 2, 1991, at D1.
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for purse-seining. 153 Fishermen argue that these "dolphin-safe"
fishing methods require them to harvest immature tuna which
not only threaten the tuna fishing industry,1 5" but could
threaten the long-term health of tuna populations. 15 5 Indeed, a
growing number of critics charge that "dolphin-safe" methods
may actually be environmentally unsound. 156 Marine biologists
contend that while new fishing practices spare dolphins, they
endanger a number of far more threatened species including
sharks and sea turtles. 157 The Tuna II ruling has widened the
rift between this environmental camp and that which promotes
the well-being of the more appealing dolphin.' 5 8
153. Warren, supra note 151, at 20. The primary alternatives involve set-
ting nets on free-swimming schools of tuna or on logs or other floating objects.
Id.
154. According to IATTC Director James Joseph, "the population of tuna
would soon be overfished, and catches would drop by between 30 and 50 per
cent.... For every dolphin saved... 9,000 undersize tuna would be dumped
overboard." Id. About two-thirds of U.S. tuna boats in the ETP ceased opera-
tions within one year of the advent of the dolphin-safe fishing requirements. Id.
That number has continued to drop. Some have argued that this decrease in
the number of U.S. vessels in the ETP has merely turned these waters over to
foreign fishing vessels. Id. The United States presently has only three boats
that still set on dolphins in the ETP compared with Mexico, which has roughly
40. Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 110, at 784 n.45. There are some fishermen
in the ETP, however, who set their nets on mature free-swimming tuna schools
not in the interest of dolphin conservation, but because it is economically ad-
vantageous for them to do so. Id.
155. Betsy Carpenter, What Price Dolphin?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
13, 1994, at 71. When fishermen set their nets around dolphins, the catch is
almost entirely adult tuna; when they set on a free-swimming school, the har-
vest is primarily juvenile tuna, many of which are too small to bother keeping.
Id. at 72. The small tuna are thrown back too late to avoid death. Thus, a
significant number of tuna are removed from the ETP before they are able to
reproduce. Id.
156. Id. at 71.
157. Id. Number of dolphins and other species caught per 1,000 tons of tuna:
Setting on: tuna schools logs dolphins
Mortality of:
Dolphins less than 1 less than 1 29
Small tuna 38,599 432,935 8,773
Mahi-Mahi 12 2,273 2
Sharks 81 870 28
Wahoo 2 425 less than 1
Billfish 20 30 5
Sea Turtles 4 2 1
Id.
158. See, e.g., Mass Deaths Stump Experts: the Dolphin Die-Off, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Aug. 24, 1987, at 12.
Few sea creatures enjoy a closer hold on the nation's affection than the
... dolphin. Gregarious and highly intelligent, these sleek mammals
are mainstay attractions at oceanariums, delighting visitors with spec-
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Adherents to this new mode of thinking do not dispute that
the ETP has historically been a killing field for dolphins.' 5 9 In
recent years, however, tuna fishermen in the ETP have been op-
erating under a stringent, multinational agreement managed by
the IATTC which has caused the dolphin mortality rate to drop
significantly. 160 According to the IATTC, only 3,609 dolphins
were killed in the ETP in 1993.161 This dramatic reduction in
mortality has been attributed to increased use of a procedure
called "backing down," wherein one end of the net is allowed to
dip under the surface before the net is hauled in, opening a
channel through which most dolphins escape. 162 Moreover, each
tuna fishing boat has been given a strict dolphin kill quota.163
Once a boat reaches its limit, it must stop fishing for the remain-
der of the year.164
Marine mammal biologists have stated that this level of
mortality poses no threat to the dolphin population in the ETP
- a population which currently numbers approximately 9.5 mil-
lion.' 65 Thus, even though some dolphins are still killed as a
result of setting on dolphin, the effects of such incidental kills
are significantly less threatening to the ETP ecosystem than any
tacular acrobatics. They balance beach balls on their noses, toss Fris-
bees, ring bells and 'walk' on water on their powerful tails. Dolphins
have such high intelligence that several animal-rights groups cam-
paign against their confinement in any conditions, likening it to jailing
an innocent person.
Id.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
160. Carpenter, supra note 155, at 71-72.
161. Id. at 72. This number demonstrates a significant drop in mortality
from that of previous years. See supra note 103.
162. Over 99 per cent of entrapped dolphins escaped from purse seine nets
through use of this procedure in 1993. Carpenter, supra note 155, at 72. The
backing down procedure, however, may itself contribute to dolphin casualties.
Sharks often wait outside of the net to attack injured or confused dolphins as
they attempt to escape. Nancy Kubasek et al., Protecting Marine Mammals:
Time for a New Approach, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y 1, 5 (1995). In addi-
tion, hundreds or perhaps thousands of dolphins die in "disaster sets," in which
the dolphins remain trapped in the nets because of disorientation or errors in
the backdown procedure. Id.
163. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
164. Carpenter, supra note 155, at 72.
165. Id. IATTC data collected in 1991 showed that incidental dolphin mor-
talities in the ETP were as follows:
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known alternative.1 66 Although this result falls short of the
zero-mortality rate sought by some environmentalists, a compro-
mise of this nature may constitute the best way to reconcile op-
posing viewpoints.
C. POSSIBLE RESOLUTION
Trade and environmental policies in the area of dolphin con-
servation can be reconciled. A resolution of the MMPA's incom-
patibility with the GATT may be reached by incorporating the
boat-by-boat standard of the IATTC into the MMPA and elimi-
nating the current provisions for imposition of unilateral sanc-
tions. Such a change offers several advantages and could
appease the conflicting factions. First, the focus of the MMPA
would shift from national fishing policies to the dolphin conser-
vation practices of individual fishing enterprises. The program
would not require other nations to modify their regulations in
any way. Rather, it would require individuals who wished to
Incidental Percent
Stock Population Mortality Mortality
Northeastern spotted 738,100
Western and/or southern spotted 1,299,300
All spotted (except coastal) 2,037,400 13,991 .69
Eastern spinner 632,700 5,879 .93
Whitebelly spinner 1,020,100 2,974 .29
Northern common 477,000 161 .03
Central common 415,600 3,182 .77
Southern common 2,211,500 115 .01
Other dolphins 2,729,100 990 .04
All 9,523,400 27,292 .29
Pedrozo, supra note 9, at 110. These numbers are significant because scientists
believe that incidental mortality rates of less than two percent are sustainable
by dolphin populations. Id.
166. Indeed, scientists have concluded that an outright ban on purse-seine
fishing in the ETP would be unwise. Id. at 107-08. One study conducted by the
National Academy of Sciences suggests that dolphin mortality can be reduced
to non-threatening levels through implementing conservation programs and de-
veloping new, dolphin-friendly fishing techniques and training of tuna boat
crews to use these fishing methods. Id. A study conducted by the National Re-
search Council concluded that purse-seine fishing is "the only commercially via-
ble way of harvesting tuna in the ETP," and that "no practical alternative"
exists. Id. (citing Michael Parrish, Study Says Ban on Nets Can't Save Dol-
phins, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1992, at Al). Other commentators have argued that
a better alternative is to harvest tuna in other areas of the ocean where tuna
schools do not associate with dolphins. Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 110, at
783 n.34 The Western Tropical Pacific, where "tremendously large numbers of
fast reproducing skipjack tuna exist," is one such alternative. Id. But see
Pedrozo, supra note 9, at 111 (noting that tuna stocks in the Western Tropical
Pacific could also become threatened if a significant number of ETP fishing
boats migrate there).
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sell their catch to the United States to comply with U.S. impor-
tation standards. 167 Fishing boats which meet the U.S. stan-
dard would be unaffected by the import prohibition and those
which do not sell tuna to the United States need not adhere to
the U.S. policy. 168 The embargo provision would thus be unnec-
essary. If the standard is not met, the United States can simply
refuse to transact with that party. This program would be facili-
tated by the existing enforcement mechanism; IATTC observers
have already been placed on most ETP fishing boats to monitor
compliance.169
This program also imposes concrete and ascertainable lim-
its on dolphin mortality. The present MMPA standard is loosely
based on U.S. kill rates over the same period for which foreign
kill is calculated.' 70 Thus, foreign fishing boats must comply
with a quota which is unknown to them until after the fact. The
IATTC program eliminates this uncertainty.
A benefit to both sides of the environmental debate is that
the IATTC program has saved thousands of dolphin lives with-
out imposing greater danger to other marine species. 171
Although the program cannot guarantee an immediate zero kill
rate, dolphin mortality under the IATTC program has con-
stantly declined due to improved fishing techniques. 172 These
results have also been achieved without reducing tuna harvests.
Finally, many nations have already embraced the IATTC's
policies. 173 Adoption of the IATTC program will immediately
eliminate any potential conflict with the other member nations
167. The same standard would apply to non-IATTC member countries. Be-
cause fishing vessels in those countries would most likely not be equipped with
the required observers, the United States could refuse to import tuna from
those boats. This refusal would be based on the boat's failure to comply and
would not directly relate to the boat's country of origin.
168. The United States constitutes approximately 65% of the world market
for tuna. Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 110, at 785 n.48. The sheer size of the
U.S. market provides an incentive to fishermen to adapt their fishing tech-
niques in order to gain access to it. Id. The downside to this policy is that those
fishing vessels that choose to sell their tuna elsewhere could continue to fish in
a manner unsafe to dolphins and could thereby gain a comparative advantage
over other, dolphin-safe fishing boats in non-U.S. markets. Id. at 785.
169. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
170. See supra text accompanying note 26.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 160-66. Because the procedure of
"backing down" is performed after setting the tuna nets on a school of dolphin,
the incidental kill of other marine species associated with alternative fishing
methods is avoided. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 160-64.
173. See Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean (EPO), July, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 936. The signatory nations included
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and these nations may impose multilateral pressure on dissent-
ing nations. 174 In addition to securing greater GATT conform-
ity, such pressure can be more effective than unilateral
sanctions and is less likely to incite retaliatory measures. De-
spite these advantages, the IATTC program has met with some
criticism.
First, IATTC observers have occasionally been harassed by
the crews of the vessels to which they were assigned. For exam-
ple, some observers reported that the crews, in placing bombs
used to herd the dolphins, set them to explode near the observ-
ers in order to "discourage them from reporting correct num-
bers."1 75 Other observers were offered bribes to lower the
number of dolphin casualties in their reports. 176 A more direct
problem arises from the possibility that some nations will sim-
ply refuse to comply with the conservation measures, 177 which
raises complaints from both environmentalists and free traders.
The environmental argument against allowing nations to
opt out of compliance is that such nations will continue to de-
plete dolphin populations. This possibility of opting out deci-
mates the very purpose of the MMPA and nullifies the efforts of
environmental conservation groups and the general public who
advocated this legislation. Although quite popular among the
general population, dolphin conservation efforts must confront
business and trade interests. A situation in which some nations
are allowed to avoid compliance with the IATTC's standards
would create a free rider problem which would harm complying
tuna fishermen in two ways. First, tuna vessels of member na-
tions would suffer inconveniences and cost increases as a result
of the additional safeguards. 78 The free rider fishing enter-
prises would not incur any of the long-term costs of these re-
forms. Second, non-complying fishing boats would be able to
pass along their lower production costs in the form of lower
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Spain, United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Id.
174. Id. The July 1994 Agreement recommends that all parties to the
Agreement take measures to insure that its terms are followed and that other
tuna-fishing nations subscribe to the Agreement. Id. The GATT prefers agree-
ments that may result from the use of such multilateral pressure as an alterna-
tive to trade sanctions. See GATT, supra note 1.
175. Kubasek, supra note 162, at 5-6.
176. Id. at 6.
177. A likely problem child is Mexico, which has consistently avoided re-
joining the IATTC since 1978. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
178. Kubasek, supra note 162, at 18.
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prices, thereby gaining an unfair competitive advantage. 7 9 De-
spite these criticisms, the IATTC's boat-based standard is pref-
erable to that of the present MMPA. In addition, this standard
is more likely to be acceptable under the GATT and provides the
best means by which to reconcile the competing interests of envi-
ronmental and trade groups.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Tuna-Dolphin cases illustrate, environmental con-
servation efforts have not fared well under GATT scrutiny.
Such measures were particularly impeded by the Tuna I prohibi-
tion on extrajurisdictionality. As environmental issues have
gained attention, however, resolution of this incompatibility has
taken on greater urgency. The second Tuna-Dolphin decision
represents a step toward conciliation between the rival pro-
trade and pro-environment camps.
The Tuna II panel's indication that extrajurisdictional
measures may be consistent with the GATT gives the United
States significant leeway in imposing environmental policies on
the global commons. The panel's primary rationale for invali-
dating the MMPA provisions was that they attempted to force
foreign nations to change their domestic policies. The panel
thus implied that if the United States amends the MMPA to
avoid this coercion, it may pass GATT scrutiny. This modifica-
tion could be attained by shifting the focus to a boat-by-boat,
rather than a country-by-country standard. This showing of
greater permissiveness on the part of GATT is especially signifi-
cant in light of the intense pressure on the U.S. Congress to sup-
port dolphin conservation efforts.
Congress is unlikely to accommodate GATT requests to
amend environmental legislation because it is not in their own
best interests to defy strong constituent and interest group pres-
sure to achieve GATT compliance. Given the opportunity to ap-
pease these domestic pressures while bringing U.S. laws into
conformity with the GATT, however, Congress may be more in-
clined to act. The difference in analysis applied by the Tuna II
panel compared to that of the previous panel may give Congress
enough space to do so.
179. Id. Although such lower prices would not apply in countries such as
the United States, which would only import dolphin safe tuna, the existence of
the competitive advantage in any market is sufficient to raise concern among
tuna fishermen.
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